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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EDWARD WILSON AMMERMAN,
by his Guardian ad Litem, La Verne
Bruce Ammerman, and EDDIE
SOLIZ,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

No.10,574

FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Eddie Soliz, the
judgment creditor, and Edward Wilson Ammerman,
the judgment debtor, in a previous action against the
insurer, Farmers Insurance Exchange, to recover the
amount of money by which a judgment secured by
Eddie Soliz against Edward 'Wilson Ammerman exceeds the policy limits of a policy of insurance issued
by the defendant and appellant herein, upon the
theory that the defendant and appellant herein was
guilty of bad faith in failing to settle the lawsuit
brought by Soliz against Ammerman for $9,000.00
prior to the trial of that action or for $10,000.00 at
the time of the trial.
1
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOVIER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment in favor of both plaintiffs the defendant
appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and
judgment in its favor as a matter of law or, that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case out of which this case grows, Soliz v.
Ammerman, was previously before this court. See
Soliz v. Ammerman, 16 Utah (2d) 11, 395 Pac. (2d)
25. In order to understand the issues in this case
a brief review of some of the facts of that action is
necessary.
On March 21, 1962 at about 8 :15 A.M. the plaintiffs herein were involved in an automobile accident
at the intersection of Second West Street and 200
North Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff Soliz
was examined shortly after that accident by Dr.
David E. Smith, Jr., who found no injuries other
than minor cuts and bruises (Soliz Dep. 13). Dr.
Smith had treated Soliz on two occasions prior to the
accident for complaints of low back pain and numbness in his right arm. This prior treatment was not
known to defendant until it was brought out in testimony during the trial (R. 189, 214). Prior to the
trial Soliz in his deposition, taken by the defendant
Farmers, had not disclosed this prior trouble when
2
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asked if he had had prior illnesses (R. 213). Subsequent to the accident Soliz complained of low back
pain and neck pain to Dr. Smith, who thereafter referred him to Dr. Irwin F. Winters for x-rays. Dr.
'i\Tinters' report indicated no abnormality. Soliz was
then referred to Dr. D. C. Bernson, a neurosurgeon,
who made his first examination on May 23, 1962
and reported Soliz' systems to be all within normal
limits and found him well developed, nourished,
healthy and not in any acute distress nor suffering
from illness ( Exh 7). Dr. Bernson examined the
x-rays taken by Dr. Winters and had additional xrays taken by Dr. Winters, who reported them as being normal. Dr. Bernson agreed that the x-rays were
essentially normal, but did feel some slight increase
in motion of the 5th and 6th cervical vertebrae was
indicated by the last x-rays (Exh. 7). Soliz was examined again on June 20, 1962 and August 4, 1962,
during which time Dr. Bernson noted a change in
grip strength and reflexes, but could find no other
changes in Soliz' condition (Exh. 7). Soliz was then
advised by Dr. Bernson to enter the hospital for a discogram, which he did on September 24, 1962. Based
upon his clinical observations and the results of the
discogram (which Dr. Bernson notes was administered with insufficient dye) he concluded that Soliz had
two ruptured cervical discs. However, he did not
recommend surgery since both he and Soliz felt the
symptoms were not severe enough to warrant surgery ( Exh. 7). There was no further evidence of
3
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further treatment by Dr. Bernson from that time up
until the trial, one year later ( R. 210).
On September 11, 1962 the plaintiff Soliz filed
a Complaint naming plaintiff Edward Wilson Ammerman as one of the defendants for recovery in the
amount of $30,000.00 general damages and $1,000.00
special damages. The defendant Farmers Insurance
Exchange employed the law firm of Hanson & Garrett to defend the action under the contract of insurance (R. 198.) On January 18, 1963 the defendant
notified Ammerman that he had the right to employ
his own counsel to be associated with Farmers' counsel in the defense of the suit (Exh. 12). Ammerman
thereafter employed Mr. Reed Richards, an attorney
practicing in Salt Lake City, to represent him in the
action (R. 185). On September 27, 1962 Mr. Richards notified Farmers of the Complaint and expressed a desire that the Ammermans would not
have to pay on any judgment (Exh. 4). And on
September 16, 1963 Mr. Richards made demand
upon Farmers to settle the case for $10,000.00 (Exh.
5). However, Mr. Richards had indicated agreement
with Farmers' counsel that the verdict would be
around $2,500.00 to $5,000.00 (R. 229). At no time
did he express an opinion as to the specific settlement value of the case. At the time the case was submitted to the jury Mr. Richards expressed satisfaction at the defense conducted by Farmers and rendered the opinion that he did not think t~ere was
any possibility of an excess verdict (R. 196A).
4
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On April 24, 1963 the plaintiff Soliz mailed to
the defendants' counsel Answers To Interrogatories
which contained a statement of the medical expenses
incurred to that date and the amount of time off
work, all of which amounted to special damages of
approximately $450.00 ( R. 167). Also submitted
pursuant to interrogatory was the medical report
submitted by Dr. Bernson on December 8, 1962
(Exh. 7, R. 319). Thereafter on April 29, 1963 the
defendants' counsel took the deposition of Soliz
(Exh. 14).
Based upon the information acquired to that
date, defendants' counsel on April 5, 1963 advised
that liability was probable and recommended as a
preliminary settlement value the amount of $6,000.00, it being a compromise between a $8,500.00
value if Bernson were colTect and a $3,500.00 value
if he were not correct ( Exh. 3). However, the evaluation was contingent upon what would be revealed
by the independent medical examination which at
that time had not been made (Exh. 3). Pursuant to
the information and recommendation received from
its counsel, the defendant Farmers put a value of
$7,500.00 on the claim as it presently stood without
a medical examination by another doctor (Exh. 9).
However, final evaluation was deferred until an independent medical was obtained. Meanwhile Soliz
had made an offer to settle the case for $9,000.00
(R. 163), to which defendant countered with an offer
of $4,500.00 (R. 165) before any independent med5
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ical information \Vas obtained. Defendant's offer
was rejected by the plaintiff Soliz. Further negotiations did not take place until the day of the trial
(R. 229), at which time Soliz offered to settle for
the policy limits of $10,000.00. However, prior to
that offer the defendant had had plaintiff Soliz
examined and had received a report from Dr. Reed
S. Clegg, an orthopedic surgeon, who examined Soliz
shortly before the trial in September of 1963. After
an extensive examination Dr. Clegg concluded that
plaintiff Soliz showed no evidence of an intervertebral disc injury, but rather showed a moderate degenerative condition of osteoarthritis, a chronic
condition existing before the accident in question,
which in his opinion would account for the symptoms
of which Soliz complained before and after the accident ( Exh. 6). In light of this information and
counsel's conclusion that Dr. Bernson's report was
inconsistent - in that he reported no abnormality
on the initial visit of Soliz and then when he did report an abnormal condition he substantiated it with
a discogram test which he himself said was administered without sufficient dye ( R. 224-225) - defendant's counsel in his final evaluation dropped
his evaluation of the case from $6,000.00 down to
$3,500.00 (R. 205). Counsel noted that even if Bernson were completely believed he would place a top
value at no more than $8,500.00 on the case ( R. 205).
Plaintiff Soliz' offer remained at $9,000.00
until the $10,000.00 offer was made at the time of
6
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trial. The case went to trial and both Dr. Clegg and
Dr. Bernson testified. Defendant Farmers' counsel
and plaintiff Ammerman's counsel both concluded
that the evidence had gone well and that the verdict
could not possibly exceed the policy limits (R. 196A).
However, the jury brought back a verdict of $15,446.25. The policy limit of $10,000.00 plus interest
was paid by the defendant after its appeal to this
court (Soliz v. Ammerman, 16 Utah (2d) 11, 395
Pac. ( 2d) 25) was unsuccessful. The remaining
judgment was never satisfied.
The present action was subsequently filed by
the plaintiffs to recover the amount of the judgment still owing. Plaintiff Eddie Soliz was present
and represented by the law firm of Kipp & Charlier.
The plaintiff Edward Wilson Ammerman did not
appear at the trial and his counsel, Reed Richards,
appeared only briefly but did not participate.
On January 10, 1966 the case came up for
trial before the Honorable A. H. Ellett. The court
made three initial determinations to which the defendant objected, to-wit: That the confidential report from defendant's counsel to defendant was
not privileged ( R. 14 7), that bad faith could be
found from the refusal to settle for either $9,000.00
or $10,000.00 (R. 146) and that the judgment creditor, Eddie Soliz, was a proper party.
The evidence in the trial was directed towards
establishing the reasonable settlement value of the
7
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prior case and what othe1· defense attorneys would
have clone in like circumstances. At this point it
should be stated parenthetically that the elements
of bad faith requfre more than a mere error in
judgment deviating from what is conside1·ecl the
reasonable settlement value. However, the evidence
as outlined below appears to not even indicate a
deviation from reasonableness and a fortiori no bad
faith.
The plaintiffs called as theil' first witness the
defendant's claims manager, Russell J. Hadley. He
testified as to the general history of the first case
and as to his evaluations and negotiations. He stated
that before the independent medical report was received he had given an initial evaluation of $7,500.00,
assuming Dr. Bernson's prognosis was confirmed
(Exh. 9). He had made an offer of $4,500.00 based
upon the assumption that there would be conflicting
medical testimony and upon his experience that jurys
tend to compromise the verdict where the medical
testimony conflicts. His final evaluation was based
on the two conflicting medical reports and, therefore,
did not differ from his prior offer which was grounded on an assumption of such conflict ( R. 189). His
opinion did not change in favor of a higher value
during the trial as he felt the evidence went better
than expected ( R. 187), especially the testimony
from Soliz that he had had low back pain and numbness in his right arm prior to the accident ( R. 189).
Plaintiffs' second witness was Don J. Hanson,
8
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defendant's counsel and a specialist in personal injury defense work (R. 221). He outlined the procedure used in processing such defenses ( R. 222),
which procedure was followed in the prior case ( R.
224). He explained the initial phase as being preliminary fact gathering on liability and damages.
In this case he had the plaintiff's medical expenses,
Dr. Bernson's report, the police report, other miscellaneous information gleaned from the plaintiff by
interrogatories and information obtained from the
defendant. With this he arrived at a preliminary
evaluation of the case of $6,000.00 based substantially upon Dr. Bernson's report ( Exh. 3). He found
that Dr. Bernson's report was rathrr indefinite in
that the initial examinations and x-rays indicated
no injury and that the unequivocal conclusion of Dr.
Bernson was based upon an inconclusive test and
upon the subjective symptoms of Soliz (R. 225). He
placed a value of $8,500.00 on the case if Soliz did
have two herniated discs, but he felt that an independent medical would be necessary in order to place
a final evaluation on the case (Exh. 3). If it were
found that Soliz did not have two herniated discs the
settlement value of the case, in his opinion, would be
$3,500.00. Thus the preliminary evaluation was a
compromise ( $6,000.00) between the two medical
possibilities ( Exh. 3). The second phase of the defense was to get further information, in this case
an independent medical examination and the deposition of the plaintiff. The purpose of the second phase
9
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is to allow for changes in the preliminary evaluation
if furthe1· information justifies such change ( R.
223). Upon receipt of Dr. Clegg's report Mr. Hanson felt such a change was called for, and therefore
in his final evaluation put the settlement value at
$3, 500. 00 ( R. 22 7) . Dr Clegg' s report not only ran
contrary to Dr. Bernson's but also gave a reason
for Soliz' symptoms, i.e. the chronic osteoarthritis
condition which he found in Soliz' back. This, coupled
with the inconsistencies in Bernson's report and the
fact that Dr. Clegg is generally agreed to be a very
forceful medical witness ( R. 252), was considered
to be sufficient to lower the value of the case considerably (R. 227). He also felt that the testimony
as to Soliz' limited activities would support just as
well the report of Dr. Clegg and, therefore, would
not weigh in Soliz' interest ( R. 233). During the
trial Mr. Hanson was of the opinion, as was Mr.
Richards, attorney for Ammerman, that the evidence was going well and that the verdict would
be no more than $3,500.00 to $5,000.00 (R. 229,
196A). He was never aware of any offer for less
than $9,000.00 from Soliz (R. 229).
Plaintiffs' first expert witness was Louis E.
Midgley. He stated that in his opinion the settlement value at the time of Dr. Bernson's report was
$7,500.00 (R. 238), but he would have settled before
trial for $10,000.00 rather than take the chance of
trying it inasmuch as he felt the medical outlook
had not changed after Dr. Bernson's report ( R. 117)
10
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and it was his opinion that in cases of liability the
jurys do not tend to compromise but tend to believe the attending physician ( R. 262). His computations were based on a formula of "10 times the
specials", which led him to the conclusion that the
probable verdict would have been $15,000.00 since
the "specials" were approximately $500.00 and the
cost of the future operation was $1,000.00 (R. 239).
However, he admitted that a possible operation was
not a "special" and that if the specials were only
$450.00 then the probable verdict would be $4,500.00 (R. 251). Mr. Midgley said that his evaluation would be $2,500.00 to $3,000.00 if the jury
believed Dr. Clegg (R. 241). However, he stated
that although Dr. Clegg was an excellent witness,
one of the best in the Salt Lake area ( R. 252), he
felt there was only a "faint" chance that the jury
would believe him since he had not seen Mr. Soliz
as many times as Dr. Bernson had ( R. 252-253),
even though he personally felt that Dr. Clegg would
be better informed of Soliz' con di ti on ( R. 255).
However, he also stated that this favorableness towards Dr. Bernson would be overcome if there was
anything in the record to indicate that the plaintiff
had been inconsistent in reporting his prior medical
history (R. 249). When it was pointed out to him
that Soliz had not disclosed his prior pains and
treatment until the time of trial, he denied this as
being important ( R. 267), although admitting that
defendant's evidence had turned out very well on
11
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the issue of the pri01· condition ( R. 267).
The plaintiffs' second expert witness was Mr.
Tel Charlier, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff
Soliz in both suits (R. 319). Mr. Charlier testified
that it was his opinion that the reasonable settlement value of the case would have been from $10,000.00 to $12,000.00 (R. 309) and that he would
have settled for the amount that his firm had offered, to-wit, $9,000.00 before trial and $10,000.00
at the time of trial (R. 312). He enumerated the
factors he would consider in coming to the valuation
on plaintiffs' Exhibit 16. However, he also admitted that losing this action would be adverse to
his own interests (R. 322). He also stated that defendant had procured all the information the plaintiff had as to injuries, loss of wages, expenses and
medical reports and, therefore, had before it as
much information as did the plaintiff (R. 320).
Defendant put on two expert witnesses who
testified as to evaluations essentially the same as
had Mr. Hadley, Mr. Hanson and Mr. Midgley,
however differing with the latter as to their confidence in going to trial with the case. The first witness was Gordon Strong, a specialist in insurance
defense work whose work is about 60 % neck injuries
(R. 280). In his opinion the settlement value of the
case prior to trial was $5,000.00 to $6,000.00 (R.
281). The facts upon which he based his opinion
were: Probable liability ( R. 281) ; the report of Dr.
Bernson and his prognosis that surgery was not im12
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mediately i·equi1·ed (R. 282); Dr. Clegg's report;
expenses of trial ( R. 285) ; expenses incurred ( R.
290) ; the fact that no fusion had been accomplished,
which in his opinion would cut down on the weight
given pain, suffering and disability (R. 292); and
the possible exposure of the insured to liability (R.
293). He testified that the value of the case based
on D1·. Be1·nson's report alone would be $7,500.00 (R.
282) and $2,500.00 if Dr. Clegg's r12port were considered alone (R. 283). His conclusion was that the
jury would p1·obably compromise at around $5,000.00
to $6,000.00. However, he would have i-ejected an
offer fo1· $9,000.00, and indicated that in regard to
such an offe1· he would have indicated to the plaintiff that he would have to get down to around $5,000.00 before there could be a settlement (R. 296).
He seriously doubted whethe1· any defense attorney
would have recommended settlement for $9,000.00
( R. 297) and would have been shocked at a verdict
in excess of $10,000.00 (R. 289).
Defendant's second witness was Harold Christensen, also a specialist in insurance defense work.
He placed the settlement value of the case before
trial at between $6,000.00 and $7,500.00 (R. 332).
In his evaluation he considered the following factors:
The actual out-of-pocket expense of the plaintiff (R.
332) ; Dr. Bernson's report, which he considered to
be too certain coming from a doctor who had not
yet operated (R. 343); Dr. Clegg's report, which he
concluded would be given more weight by the jury
13
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due to D1·. Clegg's superior qualifications and ability
as a witness ( R. 333-334) ; probable liability, which
was not, however, a flagrant or aggravated case of
negligence (R. 334); remoteness of an operation (R.
345) ; and the tendency of jurys to compromise where
there are conflicting claims ( R. 348). He unequivocally stated that he would have rejected an offer for
$9,000.00 prior to trial (R. 335) and the offer for
$10,000.00 during trial (R. 336). He discounts the
"treating physician" advantage to Dr. Bernson on
the ground that he didn't consider him the treating
doctor in this case since it appears that Dr. Smith
was the treating physician ( R. 339). Mr. Christensen also pointed out that in the "horse trading''
procedure that takes place in such cases some defense
counsel and insurance companies will offer and counter-offer until a middle ground is found, whereas
others will determine what the case is worth and
offer to settle if the plaintiff will come down to that
area, there being no single method in negotiating
(R. 344).
Mr. Charlier was recalled to the stand as a rebuttal witness and testified in relation to a prior
suit with Mr. Gordon Strong in order to impeach Mr.
Strong as an expert witness. However, Mr. Charlier
admitted that the facts were different from the present case in that there were no issues as to the incidence of the ruptured disc (R. 354) and that Mr.
Strong's evaluation of that case had been proven correct at $9,500.00 (R. 354-355).
14
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At the close of the evidence the defendant moved
for a directed verdict, which was denied. The jury
returned a special verdict against the defendant.
Subsequently the defendant moved for a new trial
or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Both
were denied.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT
THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE, THE EVIDENCE
BEING WHOLLY INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW TO ESTABLISH THE CLAIM OF BAD FAITH.

The defendant contends that the verdict of bad
faith is without any factual support and that it
should be dismissed as a matter of law. The seriousness of the charge is apparent. The plaintiffs are
seeking to hold the insurer liable for damages not
covered by the insurance contract. In effect the plaintiffs are asking that an impossible burden be placed
upon the defendant - that not only must it conduct
the defense of any action against the insured as per
the insurance contract but that it must be omniscient
in its trial judgment. It is a well recognized rule of
law that the insurer has a duty to conduct the defense of the insured in good faith, giving equal consideration to both interests, but the plaintiffs are
asking for relief due to bad faith merely because the
defendant refused to settle for the policy limits.
Upon an examination of the law and the facts it is
clear that neither contention can stand.
Negligence is conceded to be an element of bad
15
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faith, but negligence alone is not the standard of the
insurer's duty. In an excellent survey of the cases
concerning an insurer's good faith in 40 A.L.R. (2d)
168 it is concluded that the "great majority" of
the courts apply the "good faith test", while only
a "few courts" apply the negligence test. The modern trend is that the tests of good faith and negligence have coalesced, with negligence a consideration
of whether bad faith was present. Nevertheless, a
showing of bad faith is necessary. In numerous landmark cases the negligence test has been expressly
rejected. Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Co., 155 Cal.
App. (2d) 679, 319 Pac. (2d) 69 (1958); Baker v.
Northwestern National Gas Co., 125 N. W. (2d) 370,
22 Wis. (2d) 77 (1963); City of Wakefield v. Glove
Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929);
Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 108 Vt.
269, 187 Atl. 788 (1936).
The trial court correctly adopted the bad faith
test in this case, but incorrectly instructed the jury
pursuant thereto, i.e. in Instructions 12 and 14
wherein the court equates bad faith with the mere
failure to settle within the policy limits. This is a
novel question in Utah, although in Paul v. Kirkendall, 311 Pac. (2d) 376, 6 Utah (2d) 256 (1957)
the court implied acceptance of the good faith test.
The cases on this subject clearly indicate what
factors are necessary for finding bad faith. In the
landmark case of Brown ·v. Guarantee Insurance Co.,
supra, the court summed up the prior cases on bad
16
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faith and laid down the following seven factors as
the constituent parts of bad faith:
1. Attempts by the insurer to get the
insured to contribute to the settlement.
2. Failure of the insurer to investigate
the case sufficiently to ascertain the evidence
against the insured.
3. Rejection by the insurer of its agent's
or attorney's advice.
4. Failure of the insurer to inform the
insured of the settlement offers.
5. Participation by the insured by acquiescing in the insurer's conduct of the defense, or misleading the insurer as to the
facts.
6. The amount of financial risk each
party is exposed to.
7. The strength of the respective sides
as to liability and damages.
An examination of the evidence in this case shows
that there is a clear lack of substantial evidence to
support a finding against the defendant on any of
the above seven factors. The first six factors can be
dismissed summarily.
1. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the
record that the insurer made an attempt to have the
insured contribute to the settlement.
2. Negligent investigation isn't at issue here
17
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since it was not alleged by the plaintiffs. However,
even had it been alleged, the record clearly shows
that the defendant made adequate investigation of
the evidence against it. The plaintiffs' own attorney,
Tel Charlier, testified that the defendant had obtained all the information that was known to them concerning plaintiff's injuries, wage losses and expenses
(R. 320). Defendant's attorney, Don J. Hanson,
testified that he had given this case the same care
he does all his cases ( R. 224), making a preliminary investigation with the help of the defendant and
following that up with the final investigation and
report ( R. 222) . There was no evidence otherwise
presented which would indicate that defendant did
not make a sufficient investigation of the case.
3. There likewise is a dearth of evidence in the
record that the defendant rejected its counsel's advice. While it is true that its attorney gave a preliminary evaluation of $6,000.00 the defendant did not
by any means reject such advice by offering $4,500.00. As indicated many times in the trial record,
the offering of a given amount is part of the "horse
trading" that goes on in such cases and thus is not
usually meant as a final offer if the other side responds by lowering its offer. Both defendant and its
counsel were aware that the value of the case could
drop below even $4,500.00 depending upon the results of the independent medical examination. Thus,
prudence would dictate against offering the full preliminary evaluation amount when it could be subject
to considerable change downward.
18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In 40 A.L.R. (2d) 168 cases are cited where
rejection of the attorney's advice was the primary
basis of bad faith. However, in those cases the attorneys had usually made repeated warnings to the
insurer to settle at an amount presently acceptable
by the plaintiff because of their prognosis that the
verdict would exceed the policy limits. That is far
from the present case. Here the record fails to indicate any disagreement between the defendant and
its attorney about whether or not to settle the case.
It must be remembered that defendant is guilty of
bad faith here only if it had knowledge or reason to
believe that the verdict would exceed the policy limits.
The fact that the defendant offe1·ed in its initial
bargaining offer $4,500.00 rather than the $6,000.00
recommended as an eventual settlement figure is of
no relevance in ascertaining the ultimate issue here
for two reasons : First, there was no evidence that
defendant would not have settled for $6,000.00 had
the plaintiff showed an inclination to descend from
his $9,000.00 offer. It should be noted that the plaintiff at no time offered to settle within even the upper
range of value set by defendant and its attorney assuming Dr. Clegg's report was given no weight. Secondly, defendant cannot be guilty of bad faith towards the insured unless in its bargaining process
it contemplated a verdict in excess of the policy limits.
If the defendant honestly believed, for example, that
the verdict would not be over $5,000.00 but acted
with reckless disregard of its own rights in not ac19
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cepting an offer for $4,000.00, the insured could not
claim bad faith for at no time did the insurer knowingly endanger the insured's interests, but rather
endangered its own interests. The defendant in the
present case was merely being prudent in keeping its
initial offer within the scope of what the final evaluation would support. There obviously was not any
substantial evidence upon which to base an adverse
finding against the defendant.
4. There was not a scintilla of evidence in the
record that the plaintiff Ammerman or his attorney,
Reed Richards, were not informed of the settlement
offers. What evidence was introduced showed that
Ammerman's attorney was present when the $10,000.00 offer was made on the first day of trial.
5. The factor of the insured's acquiescence not
only works in the defendant's favor by vitiating bad
faith but also presents an absolute defense to the
action. This is not a case where the insured was
without counsel of his own choosing and thus dependent upon the insurer's counsel, but rather in
this case Ammerman had his own attorney who was
present at the pre-trial hearings and at the trial.
Ammerman's counsel made no objection to the conduct of the defense nor to the refusal of the offers
of settlement. In fact he praised defendant's counsel
for the good job done in defending the action (R.
196A). True, he sent the standard demand for settlement to the defendant, but at no time does the evi20
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dence disclose his dissent to any of the defendant's
decisions.
Plaintiff Ammerman is in an inconsistent position. He was fully represented in the defense of the
action - yet he now seeks to hold the defendant accountable for the manner in which the defense was
made, clearly an estoppel situation. In Royal Transit
v. Central Surety & Insurance Corp., 168 Fed. (2d)
345 (CA 7th Wis. 1948) the court said it was difficult to see how the insurer in any case could be
guilty of bad faith in refusing to make a settlement
when such ref us al was agreed to or joined in by the
insured. And in New Orleans & C. R. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 114 La. 153, 38 So. 89 the court
said that the insured would have to prove not only
that it urged the acceptance of the compromise
and protested against defending the suit but that it
absolutely declined to have anything to do with the
defense; and that if such were not shown the insured
was barred from recovery. And in Lawson & Nelson
Sash & Door Company v. Associated Tnde1nnity Corp.
204 Minn. 50, 282 N.W. 481 at 48:1-484 the court
held, in affirming a directed verdict for the insurer:
"We think defendant's conduct of the
case from beginning to end bespeaks good faith
on its part and that it acted upon reasonable
grounds in proceeding as it did. After all, the
probabilities and even the possibilities were as
well known to the plaintiff as to the defendant.
Both parties had full knowledge of all the
facts. Plaintiff's proof does not even suggest
that it was misled by reason of any suppres21
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sion of facts on the part of the defendant nor
of any fraud being practiced by it. The most
that can be said about the whole situation
retrospectively is that Mr. Watson's judgment
was better than that of Mr. Sawyer's ... "
The same rule obviously applies to plaintiff Soliz
who, if validly a party to the action, is subject to the
rights and limitations existing between the defendant and plaintiff Ammerman.
The evidence when viewed most favorably to
the plaintiffs discloses Ammerman's approval of the
defendant's conduct of the defense, including the rejection of the settlement offers, and thus bars both
plaintiffs from recovering for alleged bad faith in
connection with such defense. For this reason alone
the trial court was obligated to direct a verdict in
defendant's favor.
6. The factor of financial risk is an inchoate
factor because it usually is of importance only where
some of the other elements of bad faith are established. In essence what the courts are requiring is
that the interests of the insured should not be abandoned merely because the insurer faces the prospect
of full loss. Southern Fire and Casualty Co. v. Norris,
35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W. (2d) 785 (1952). An
examination of the cases in 40 A.L.R. (2d) 168 shows
no correlation between amounts of risk per se and
bad faith. In the present case the amount of risk
to both parties, when considered from the viewpoint
of what was claimed and what the defendant thought
the case was worth, is clearly not unreasonable. The
22
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defendant had a right to look after its own interests.
There is no rule of law that the insurer must automatically pay the policy limits merely to protect the
insured from possible liability. The insurer has a
duty to consider the interest of the insured equally
with that of its own, but has no duty to sacrifice its
own interest. The general rule is that the insured
must give equal consideration to both interests, not
sole consideration to the interests of the insured. See
Brown v. Guarantee l'nsu1·ance Co., supra, and 40
A.L.R. (2d) 168. The California Supreme Court in
Hodges v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 18 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 24, 198 Cal. App. (2d) 564 (1961) correctly expresses the respective rights as:
"To extend liability based upon bad faith
to include every case where an insurer rejects
an offer of settlement below policy limits, regardless of the exercise of its honest judgment, is not necessary for the adequate protection of the insured's interests under the
policy. The effect of such extension would be
only to permit the injured plaintiff to hold the
insurance carrier for the full amount of any
verdict or judgment and without reference to
the amount of the insurance carried or purchased by the insured. . ."
The test was set down in Larson v. Anchor Casualty Co., 82 N.W. (2d) 376, 384, 249 Minn. 339
(1957), to-wit:
"The insurer is under no duty to compromise a claim for the sole benefit of its insured if to continue the fight offers a fair and
reasonable prospect of escaping liability under
23
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its policy or of getting off for less than the
policy limit. .. "
In that case the settlement offer was $8,500.00 and
the verdict was for $62,000.00, but the court found
no bad faith because the insurer had reasonable and
probable cause for rejecting the offer of settlement.
The amounts in the present case are not nearly as
extreme and, therefore, the same conclusion is more
easily arrived at. The evidence in the present case
discloses that all of the witnesses but one put a value
on the case at no higher than $8,500.00, assuming Dr.
Bernson's prognosis to be correct and discounting
completely D1·. Clegg's findings. Mr. Charlier put a
value of $10,000.00 to $12,000.00 on the case, but his
interest in the case alone should be sufficient to reduce considerably the weight of his testimony. It
has been held that although an attorney with an interest in the case is competent to testify, little weight
should be given to it. Johnson v. Nevenhoi·en, 100
N.E. (2d) 60, 344 Ill. App. 125 and Jonas i'. Meye1·s,
101 N.E. (2d) 509, 410 Ill. 213 (1951).
M1·. Midgley, plaintiffs' other expert witness,
gave his opinion as to the settlement value before
trial, based on Dr. Bernson's report, at $7,500.00
( R. 238). He indicated, however, that he would have
settled for the policy amounts rather than take the
risk of trying the case. He based this apprehension
upon his belief that the jury could return a verdict
in the amount of ten times the special damages, which
he computed to be $1,500.00. However, he admitted
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on cross examination that $1,000.00 of the special
damages figure represented an item not properly
considered as a special damage, i.e. the cost of an
operation which had not yet been performed nor
prescribed. Mr. Midgley agreed that if the damages
were limited to the $500.00 which had been proved,
by this theory the probable verdict would be approximately $5,000.00. Mr. Midgley, therefore, essentially
agreed with the other four witnesses who put their
upper value at between $8,500.00 and $6,000.00
based on Dr. Bernson's report alone. This evidence
clearly establishes the fact that an evaluation with
an upper limit of $8,500.00 was in this case reasonable and honest, as was also the dropping of that
upper limit to between $3,500.00 to $6,000.00 when
Dr. Clegg's findings became known.
As Mr. Christensen pointed out in his testimony, many times lawyers can agree as to the value
of a case, as in cases of conflicting medical opinions,
by assuming that a jury will try to compromise to
the middle ground ( R. 348) .
It appears obvious from the record that all the
experts but one agreed generally as to the value of
this case, all of which were under the policy limits
even when considering Dr. Bernson's report alone.
It hardly can be said that the defendant acted in
bad faith in not settling for the policy amount
when its honest and reasonable evaluation of the
case was considerably lower than the policy amount.
The contrariness of this particular verdict is em25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

phasized by the fact that all the witnesses, including Mr. Charlier, were proven to be wrong in their
appraisals of the case. However, recovery for bad
faith must be bottomed on a foundation other than
mere mistake in judgment, or even upon negligent
judgment. Rather there must be a showing that the
insurer acted dishonestly or fraudulently or with
such marked disregard to the realities of the situation that bad faith is necessarily inferred. Defendant asserts that the evidence does not substantiate
a finding that defendant took even an unreasonable
risk with its insured's interest, let alone an abandonment of those interests.
7. The relative strength of each side of the case
is the most important element in this case, as in most
other cases, for it involves the state of mind of the
defendant as to the strength of its case and to the
probable consequences of asserting that case. The
courts in applying this factor have generally demanded only that the insurer honestly believe it has
a good case, not that it in fact does. The courts have
been hesitant to interpose their hindsight in place
of the insurer's judgment. In Hodges v. Standard
Accident Ins. Co., supra, the court said, in reversing
a finding of bad faith:
"The art of appraising a case is, of
course, not an exact science and there is room
for variety of honest judgments. The insurer
must appraise the case prior to the trial upon
its general experience and the insurer should
not be penalized for its failure to predict ac26
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curately the action of a jury...
". . . We do not believe the test of bad
faith should be determined by hindsight. Experience shows that in looking ahead no one
can predict what any particular jury will do."
In that case the insurer believed that, even assuming
liability, the damages would be not more than $3,500.00. The offer to settle was for $5,000.00. The
verdict was for $35,000.00. In the finding no bad
faith, the court said if the insurer "sincerely believed
any probable verdict would be substantially less than
$10,000 then it was not in the position of playing or
gambling with the interests of the insured". (Supra,
at 24)
The facts as conceded above do show an honest
mistake in judgment by everyone concerned. However, there is no evidence in the record that either the
defendant or its attorney acted contrary to their
honest and reasonable evaluation of the settlement
value of the case. At most the record merely shows
that the defendant had an opportunity to settle the
case within the policy limits and refused to do so
upon the belief derived from experience that the
jury would compromise between the two medical
witnesses, especially where the collateral evidence
substantiates either one of the medical prognoses.The
testimony of the witnesses in the present action confirms that the defendant was not operating under
unreasonable optimism. Both Mr. Strong and Mr.
Christensen unequivocally stated that they would
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not have settled the case at any time for $9,000.00
or $10,000.00. Mr. Strong, a veteran of many years
of personal injury defense practice, stated that he
would have been shocked by a verdict above the policy
limits. (R. 289). The fact that the witnesses were
also proved wrong is not the point. The point is that
the defendant defended this action under what has
been established by the record as a reasonable prognosis, it being in accordance with what other experts
in this field would have done under like circumstances.
This court in its opinion on the appeal of the
first action referred to the question of damages as a
"sharp disagreement between the medical testimony
of the plaintiff's and defendants' doctors concerning
the meaning and effect of what the x-rays show".
Soliz v. Am11ierrrwn, supra. In his dissent Justice
Callister said, "There was serious dispute among the
expert witnesses as to the proper interpretation of
the various x-ray films". (Supra at 28) This obvious conflict was known fully to the defendant. Defendant knew that Dr. Bernson had found no abnormality in his first examination of Soliz and in the
x-rays taken by Dr. Winters on two different occasions (Exh. 7), and that when he finally did conclude
that Soliz had two ruptured discs he relied upon a
discogram which he admittedly administered with
insufficient dye (R. 225). Defendant knew at the
trial that Soliz had complained of low back pain and
numbness in his right arm prior to the accident in
28
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question (R. 263). Defendant was aware of the
fact that the independent medical examination which
was made a year after Dr. Bernson's last examination had found no trace of a ruptured disc, had
found a chronic degenerating condition of osteoarthritis which was in no way connected with the
accident. Defendant knew, as did plaintiff's own
witness (R. 252) that Dr. Clegg was a more forceful
and more effective medical witness than Dr. Bernson.
Defendant knew that Dr. Bernson had not prescribed
corrective surgery since the symptoms did not justify
it (Exh. 7), and thus the cost of an operation would
not be included in the special damages. And defendant also knew that liability was probable and took
that into consideration in its evaluation (R. 201).
And from his deposition and answers to interrogatories the defendant knew the expenses claimed by
Soliz from loss of wages and medical expenses.
Collating this information with its experience,
defendant concluded that in such a case the jury
would probably compromise the damages between
what it felt the damages were solely under Dr. Bernson's report and those solely under Dr. Clegg's report.
Both Mr. Strong and Mr. Christensen confirmed this
belief that the jury would compromise ( R. 283, 348),
and both stated that they would not have settled at
any time for $9,000.00 or more (R. 283, 284, 335,
336). There was no evidence that plaintiff, even in
response to defendant's initial offer, ever lowered his
offer from $9,000.00.
29
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Can it reasonably be concluded upon any basis
that defendant acted dishonestly or fraudulently by
not taking an offer higher than the value ascribed to
the case assuming no contrary medical testimony
from an independent medical exambation? Clearly
not. Yet the plaintiff has presented no other evidence
relevant to the issue of bad faith. ·when plaintiffs
rested their case they had merely proved that they
made an offer near the policy limits, which offer was
rejected by a lower counter-offer. They failed to even
bring up the other elements of bad faith herein discussed simply because there was no evidence to support them.
When the defendant rested its case it had shown
that the rejecting of the offer to settle for the policy
limits was not only reasonable under the circumstances but was the prudent course to follow. With
the evidence in that posture the trial court should
have granted defendant's request for a directed verdict.
The recent cases on the subject of bad faith
indicate that much more must be shown by the plaintiffs than was shown below in order to present a triable issue of bad faith for the jury. In Frank B. Connet Lurnber Co. v. New Anisterda11i Casualty Co.,
236 Fed. (2d) 117, 127 (CA 8th 1956) the court affirmed a directed verdict against the plajntiff insured on the basis that
" ... where the evidence is conflicting or gives
rise to conflicting inferences (it) does not, in
our opinion, justify a finding of bad faith."
30
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There the policy limit was $15,000.00 and the
offer was $12,500.00. The verdict was for $35,000.00. The doctor for the plaintiff testified that
the plaintiff had incurred a ruptured intervertebral
disc and required surgery. The defendant's doctor
testified that his x-rays showed no evidence of such
injury. The court said that to allow the insured to
prevail under such circumstances, where the insurer
justifiably believed the action to be without merit,
would be to grant unlimited coverage on a limited
coverage policy. The situation there is clearly analagous with the present case.
In the case of Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding
And Insurance Co., 339 Mass. 184, 158 N.E. (2d)
338 (1959) the situation was again very similar.
There the policy limit was $10,000.00 and the offer
after the second trial was $9,300.00. The verdict was
$29,000.00. The plaintiff claimed that she had lost
her sense of smell and had suffered a fractured
skull due to the accident. The insurer admitted liability, but alleged no skull fracture. The court said
the test to be applied was whether the insurer considered the offer as it would had there been no policy
limit. In affirming a finding of no bad faith the
court said
"It appears from the record that the insurer caused detailed investigations to be
made into both the circumstances of the accident and the facts relative to damage. These
investigations tended to corroborate the claimant's contention that she had lost her sense
31
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of smell as a result of the accident, but as to
the seriousness of the othe1· injuries medical
opinion was divided, and the insurer's information was that the claimant had not sustained a fracture of the skull as a result of
the accident." (Supra, at 341)
Thus, where the medical opinion is divided over
the extent and cause of the damages it would appear
that there is no bad faith unless the insurer has acted
dishonestly or fraudulently. This test of bad faith is
clearly expressed in the following cases.
In Olson v. Union Fire lnsumnce Co., 118 N.W.
(2d) 318, 174 Neb. 375 (1962) the Supreme Court
of Nebraska reversed the trial court's refusal to
not grant a directed verdict for the insurer. The
policy limit there was $10,000.00 and the verdict
was for $50,000.00. The offer was for the policy
limit. The suit was brought under the guest statute.
The insurer said it honestly believed there was no
gross negligence. The test of bad faith used by the
court was
" ... Bad faith implies dishonesty, fraud
and concealment ... Neither mistaken judgment nor unreasonable judgment is the equivalent of bad faith." (Supra, at 322)
Using that test, the court found that the plaintiff
insured had not established a prima facie case of bad
faith by the insurer's refusal to settle within the policy limits. In coming to that conclusion the court
reasoned:
"Whether or not the evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding of gross negligence
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was a close question as shown by the meticulous care with which the facts were considered
by the court in (the prior case) . Courts as well
as attorneys sometimes differ on the law applicable to a given state of facts (citation omitted). We find none of the elements of negligence or bad faith existed in the making of
these determinations. The conclusion of the
insurance company that it had a valid defense,
although wrong, is not in itself evidence of
negligence or bad faith." (Supra, at 322)
The rule could not be more clear as applied to
the facts in the present case. Where none of the other
factors of bad faith are present, and where there is
no showing that the insurer's faith in its case was
dishonest or fraudulent but was merely a close
question of fact, the court should direct a verdict in
favor of the insurer. Two recent cases are right on
point.

In Baker v. Northwestern National Gas Co.,
supra, the policy limit was $25,000.00 and the verdict
was for $40,000.00. The insurer moved for a summary judgment which was refused. The Supreme
Court remanded to the trial court to determine three
issues raised by the amended complaint, to-wit,
whether the insurer had been diligent in its investigation; whether insured was informed of the possible
excess; and whether the insured was informed of the
settlement offers. But the court then went on to say
"Therefore, if Baker (plaintiff) had
grounded his cause of action against Northwestern solely on the facts: ( 1) that North33
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western had rejected an offer by Walker to
settle the latter's negligence action for the
policy limit of $25,000.00; and (2) that the
final judgment recovered by Walker against
Baker and Northwestern was in excess of
$40,000; Northwestern would have been entitled to summary judgment under the rule of
the Maroney and Berk cases. The facts before
the circuit court were not so limited ... " (Supra, at 372)
However, in the present case the facts are so
limited in the complaint and in the record, merely
alleging that the defendant had refused to settle and
that the final judgment was in excess of the limit.
Under the Wisconsin court's rule a directed verdict
should be granted in the present case. The defendant
recommends that the court adopt the rule used by
the Wisconsin court, which is
"It is not bad faith if counsel for an automobile liability insurer refuses to settle the
claim of an injured person under the bona fide
belief that the insurer might defeat the action
or keep the verdict within the policy limits,
and even though it may be that the insurer
acted negligently, exercising poor judgment,
it is not enough to show that the insurer acted
negligently in deciding to litigate rather than
to settle the case, bad faith being a species of
fraud requiring clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to sustain a finding thereof."
(Supra, at 372)
The case of Radio Taxi Service, Inc. v. Lincoln
Mutual Insurance Co., 157 A. (2d) 319, 31 N.J. 299
( 1960) is even more explicit in its holding, applying
34
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--the rule recommended as dictum in the Baker case.
The policy limit was $5,000.00 and the verdict was
for $13,500.00. The offer was made before trial for
$3,600.00. The trial court granted a dismissal to the
insurer on the grounds that no jury question had been
raised as to the insurer's acting in bad faith. This
was a novel question before the New Jersey court,
which adopted the bad faith test and affirmed the
dismissal. The court gave these reasons for not allowing the question to go to the jury:
". . . There was a sharp issue as to the
credibility of Mrs. Meyer's testimonial assertion of her injury, and an equally sharp issue
among the medical witnesses on the same subject. But more important, the proof provides
substantial support for defendant's view when
settlement was discussed that on all the circumstances of the case Mrs. Meyer's adjustment demand of $3,600 should be rejected.
"On the whole record we find nothing in
the facts to warrant an inference sufficient to
raise a jury question that the insurer did not
exercise good faith in reaching the conclusion
that Mrs. Meyer's case did not have a settlement value of $3,600. . ..
"The ultimate question is not whether a
verdict in excess of the policy limits should
have been anticipated, but whether the insurer
lacked good faith in deciding not to meet the
settlement demand. Mere failure to settle within the policy limit when there was an opportunity to do so before or during trial is not
evidence of bad faith ..
"In this case, no facts were presented
35
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which would warrant a finding that the defendant was unduly venturesome at the expense of the insured, or that the danger of an
adverse verdict in the accident case was so
great as to create an inference of bad faith in
rejecting the settlement offer, or that the decision not to meet the settlement demand
sprang from optimism unrelated to the realities of the case. In such a situation, to allow
a jury to review the decision not to accept the
settlement offer is to subject every such case
where the verdict exceeds the policy limit to
reappraisal by their uninformed judgment.
Such a course would empty of significant content the contractual stipulation which places
control of settlement in the hands of the insurer." (Supra, at 325, 326, 327)
The rule is sound, and the policy argument is
fair and logical. The insured should have to allege
and show more than mere refusal to settle as a basis
for bad faith. The insured contracted with the insurer for insurance only up to the policy limit. Had
the insured wanted more protection it could have
been obtained for a nominal amount. The point,
therefore, is that the insured wants his cake and to
eat it too. He wants the insurer to insure him up to a
certain limit, defend all actions and then pay the
excess merely because it refused to settle before trial
where it honestly believed that it could prove the damages resulting from the accident to be less than the
policy limit.
The defendant contends, therefore, that under
the above tests for bad faith the plaintiffs did not
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raise substantial evidence in support of any of the elements of bad faith. The record shows, and this Court
agreed, that the back injury and its cause was a close
question. The defendant honestly believed that the
jury would compromise the conflicting damage
claims, which belief was affirmed by Mr. Strong,
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Hanson. The optimism of
the insurer was in line with the realities of the situation. The record fails to show even negligence or poor
judgment. It merely shows a close question of injury
which was decided in favor of the plaintiff Soliz for
an amount in such excess above each witness' prognosis that it can only be explained as a fruit of the
vagaries within our jury system. However, as the
cases point out, the case should not be submitted to
the jury unless there is a clear question of fact with
supporting evidence as to the constituent elements
of bad faith, and not when the question is merely
whether or not the insurer acted wisely or reasonably
in refusing to settle for the policy limits. The unwarranted danger to the insurer is obvious where the
jury is given carte blanche in passing upon the techical matters of judgment involved in the negotiation
and trial of a lawsuit in a context outside mere negligence. In 40 A.L.R. (2d) 173 the commentator notes
that where the jury is given such discretion the insurer has only a "tenuous chance" of escaping liability in "any case" where a sizeable judgment results
after the rejection of a settlement. Defendant merely
asks that the court require bad faith to be proved as
a matter of law rather than allowing a verdict of
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bad faith to stand where the evidence at most shows
a honest misjudgment as to what a particular jury
would do.
The probability of such a verdict was compounded by the court's Instruction 12, wherein the court
equates bad faith with merely the failure to settle
within the policy limits when such an opportunity
avails itself. The court instructed in part:
"The only issue before you is whether or
not defendant is liable to plaintiffs . . by
reason of the fact that the defendant was
guil~y of bad faith in that it failed to settle
the Soliz claim prior to trial when it could do
so for $9,000 or, when that offer was withdrawn, at the trial, it failed to settle before the
jury returned the verdict of $10,000."
This instruction undoubtedly encouraged the jury to
find against the insurer merely upon its refusal to
settle, notwithstanding the defendant's good faith
in such refusal.
Defendant respectfully contends that the trial
court erred in not granting defendant's motion for a
directed verdict on the ground that plaintiffs were
estopped due to their acquiescence in the defendant's
conduct of the defense; and because the findings,
when viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs, are,
in the words of this Court ( Lemnwn v. D. & R. G. W.
R., 9 Utah (2d) 195) "not supported by any substantial evidence, or the evidence is so clear that all
reasonable minds would find one way, so that a verdict contrary thereto must have resulted from passion
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or prejudice, or niisconception of the law or the e?.:ide11ce, or in arbitrary disregard thereof."
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING INTO EVIDENCE, OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE DEFENDANT, THE CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND ITS ATTORNEY.

The trial court, prior to trial, took under advisement and denied defendant's objection to the introduction into evidence of the confidential report sent to
the defendant by its attorneys, Hanson & Garrett.
The court reasoned that the material issue of this
case revolved around what was contained in that report. Therefore, it would be allowed in as evidence
(R.147).
It is the contention of the defendant that the
communications between defendant's counsel and
the defendant are confidential and privileged by
Section 78-24-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953. That
statute specifically states that a witness cannot be
examined as to communications made between attorney and client in the course of professional employment. It would naturally follow that this privilege
would apply equally to documents containing such
privileged communications. The court seemingly construed Rule 30 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
as being applicable in this case when it allowed in
evidence the communications on the ground that they
were relevant to the material issue of the case. Surely
the absolute privilege given in Section 78-24-8, Utah
Code Annotated 1953 is not to be emasculated by
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such a broad reading of Rule 30 (b). However, even
under Rule 30 (b) the communications would be undiscoverable since the confidential report was a work
product of the attorney, containing his conclusions
as to the settlement value of the case, which are expressly covered by the statute:
". . . The court shall not order the production or inspection of any part of the writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories.

"

There are a number of cases which expressly
grant a privilege to such communications when made
by the insurer's attorney to the insurer.
In Farm, Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v.
Anderson, 360 S. W. (2d) 314 (Missouri, 1962) the
court held a communication between insurer's attorney and its branch claims manager in reference to
contemplated litigation was privileged, but the court
said it would not be if it had been a communication
in the ordinary course of business.
The case of Meleo System, v. Receivers of Trans
America Ins. Co., 105 So. (2d) 43 (Alabama, 1958)
involved an action in equity by receiver to accept a
compromise settlement with a reinsurer. The creditors of the insurer in receivership resisted the settlement. An attorney for the receiver and one for the
insurer assessed a value to each case, some of which
were still pending, in order to get a compromise value.
The receiver's attorney refused to answer, on exam40
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ination, as to the value given each case. The court
sustained the lower court's ruling that the testimony
was privilegd.
In Continental Casualty Co. v. Pogorzelski, 82
N.vV. (2d) 183 (Wisconsin, 1957) the insurer sued
the insured to collect attorney fees for settling the
claim against the insured. The insured requested the
production of a letter from the attorney to the insurer which contained advice on the claims against
the insured and the present action. The court refused
to allow the production of such letter, it being privileged.
The case of General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Mitchell, 259 Pac. (2d) 862
(Colorado, 1953) was a garnishment action against
the insurer. Prior to trial the lower court allowed
the production of letters between the insurer's attorney and the home office. The court said that the contents of the letters showed a complete disregard for
ethics and admissions which would seriously hamper
the present defense, but held that despite its disapproval of the contents the letters were nevertheless
privileged from production.
In Ernerson v. Western Autonwbile Indrn. Association, 182 Pac. 647 (Kansas, 1919) a trustee in
bankruptcy sued the insurer for indemnity of a judgment of $2,500.00 which was obtained against the
bankrupt insured, which judgment was never satisfied due to the bankruptcy. The court held that the
insurer was not liable except as to amounts actually
41
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paid by the insured. The trustee then claimed that
the insurer's attorney had advised insured to take
out bankruptcy. The lower court allowed evidence
to show this communication. The court held this to
be error, that the communications were privileged
and such privilege was lost only if there were fraud
involving moral turpitude.
The defendant, by arguing this point, does not
infer that the contents of the communication indicated bad faith on the part of the insurer. However, it
did contain information that the defendant's attorney made a preliminary recommendation of $6,000.00
as the value of the case. To the jury it obviously
meant that the insured had disregarded its attorney's
advice by offering $4,500.00 and, therefore, was evidence of bad faith. It seems clear that the defendant
was prejudiced in this action by the error of the trial
court in violating the confidential communications
between the attorney and client.
It should be noted in this respect that Ammerman cannot claim here that he was also the client
of defendant's attorney and has, therefore, given authority to disclose such information. He had his
own attorney and was in no way associated with defendant's attorney on an employment basis. Defendant concedes that had Ammerman had no attorney
there may be reason to hold that Ammerman had
adopted defendant's attorney as his own. This seems
to be the usual situation where the courts have let
in similar communications. However, in the present
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case the communication was solely between defendant and its attorney, as vvas also the employment
relationship.
The court obviously violated defendant's privilege by ordering production of the documents, and
their use as evidence in the ti·ial caused irreparable
prejudice against the defendant in the minds of the
jurors.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE
PLAINTIFF SOLIZ FROM THIS ACTION, HE BEING
WITHOUT ANY RIGHTS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
FOR AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF THE POLICY
LIMITS.

Defendant contends that Soliz was an improper
party in this suit and prejudicial error was committed by the trial court in allowing Soliz to prosecute
the action. The case file and transcript of the record
show that Soliz' attorneys were the only active participants for the plaintiffs in the pleading, discovery
and trial stages. Ammerman's attorney did not participate in the pre-trial conference, in the various
hearings of motions before the court or in the trial
of the action.
The rule applicable to this issue has been clearly
defined by this Court, as well as many others. In
Paul v. Kirkendall, supra, the court expressly held
that the judgment creditor had no rights in a garnishment action against the insurer for its alleged
bad faith in not settling the prior suit within the
policy limits. Although the action here is a direct
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suit and not a garnishment action, the pl'inciples
enunciated by this Coul't would appea1· to be equally
applicable. The Coul't pointed out in the Paul case
that an action against an insul'el' for bad faith was
an unliquidated tort claim and, therefore, the cause
of action belonged only to the insured. The court
noted this result if the judgment creditor were allowed to prosecute the garnishment action:
" . . . To do so compels the garnishee to
enter into combat with an adversary other
than its insured and battle with one who had
nevel' had any contract relation with him."
(Supra at 260)
This reasoning applies equally to the present action
where the defendant had to do battle with a pa1·ty
having no contrnct relation to it. The various cases
which have dealt with this specific issue have made
it cleai· that without some special statute or provision
in the insurance contract giving the judgment creditor equal rights with the insm·ed the judgment creditor could not sue the insure1· for an amount in excess
of the policy limits.
In the recent case of Dillinglwni v. Tri-State Insurcmce Co., 381 S.W. (2d) 914 (Tenn. 1964) the
court pointed out that in the cases allowing the judgment credito1· to sue the1·e was a pl'ovision in the insurance contract entitling the judgment creditor to
i·ecove1· to the same extent that the insured could have
had he paid the judgment. The court distinguished
that provision from the one befo1·e it, which afforded
the judgment Cl'editor the right to recover under the
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policy to the extent of the insurance afforded. In
reference to the former provision the court said:
". . . Typical policies now in use do not
contain this provision; in the absence of such a
policy p1·ovision the courts have declined, as to
the cause of action in excess of policy limits, to
permit direct recovery by claimant against the
company. The excess liability of the company
arises out of the i·elationship between insured
and company. Claimant is a stranger to that
relationship. Not only is the company without
any duty to claimant to accept claimant's reasonable settlement offer, but also, if there is a
sizeable disparity between the settlement offer
and the amount of the judgment obtained in
the trial which follows refusal of the offer,
claimant is benefited rather than harmed by
the company's refusal to settle. It therefore
would be anomalous to permit claimant to recover directly against the company in his own
right (in the absence of a policy provision,
such as the italicised phrase above, clearly
having that meaning)."
The court affirmed the dismissal of the action.
The same rule has been applied in various other
cases, towit: Frances Newlon, 75 Ga. App. 341, 43
S.E. (2d) 282 (1947); Duncan v. Luniberrnan's Mutual Casualty Co., 91 N.H. 349, 23 A. (2d) 325
(1941); Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Hicks Rubber
Co., 140 Tex. 586, 169 S.W. (2d) 142 (1943); Chittick i·. State Fann Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 170 F.
Supp. 276 (DC Del.); Murray 'V. Mossman, 355 Pac.
(2d) 985, "\iVash.; Wesing v. American Indemnity
Co., 127 F. Supp. 775 (DC Mo.).
45
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There have been several cases allowing the
judgment creditor to maintain a bad faith action, but
those cases involve either a provision similar to the
one referred to and distinguished in the Dillingham
case, supra, Auto. Mutual lndeninity Co. v. Shaw,
134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 ( 1938) or an assignment
under a specific state statute allowing tort claims to
be assigned, Communale v Traders & General Ins.
Co., 50 Cal. (2d) 654, 328 Pac. (2d) 198.
The provision in the present case is similar to
that which was before the Dillingham court, it merely
gives the judgment creditor a right to recover against
the insurer subject to the terms and limitations of
the policy. The provision reads:
"(6) ACTION AGAINST THE COMPANY
. . . As respects the insurance afforded
under Coverages A and B, whenever
judgment is secured against the insured
or the executor or administrator of a deceased insured in an action based upon
bodily injury, death, or property damage, then an action may be brought
against the Company on the policy and
subject to its terms and limitations, by
such judgment creditor to recover on the
. dgment . . . "
JU
Thus Soliz was not assigned under the contract
itself the right to recover for bad faith of the insurer,
nor can he claim rights under an assignment from
Ammerman for two reasons: First, there was no
such assignment from Ammerman; and, secondly,
46
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such a tort claim is not assignable in Utah. See Mayer
v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 Pac. (2d) 611.
The prejudice resulting to the defendant from
this error was substantial. Soliz' atto1·neys in the
present action were the firm of Kipp & Charlier, who
had also tried the original suit for the plaintiff. In
the trial the court repeatedly admonished counsel that
this suit was not to be a retrial of the original action.
However, the record is replete with inquiry by Soliz'
counsel as to the details of Soliz' injuries, his inability
to perform his job and other activities and the medical treatment he received-thus a retrial of issues
now irrelevant in deciding defendant's good or bad
faith. Additional prejudice was engendered by the
absence of Ammerman throughout the trial and the
presence of Soliz at the counsel table as a party plaintiff, thereby impressing upon the jury that what they
were really deciding was whether the injured plaintiff should get what a prior jury had awarded him.
It appears obvious that under such circumstances
the jury could not objectively weigh the claim of bad
faith when it appeared that they were redetermining
the prior case with the same contending partiesSoliz as plaintiff and Farmers defending. In a bad
faith case the trial court must take every precaution
to prevent the retrial of the prior cause of action and
limit the inquiry into the elements of bad faith. The
trial court here failed to prevent such appearance by
allowing Soliz to prosecute the action.
The defendant, therefore, contends that the
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plaintiff Soliz was an improper party in this action
for two reasons: First, he had no rights by assignment or otherwise over and above the policy amount;
and, secondly, he suffered no damage since had the
insurer settled for the $9,000.00 amount Soliz would
have received $1,000.00 less than he has already collected. The error of the trial court was clearly prejudicial to the defendant and, therefore, a new trial
should be granted if the Court denies the relief prayed for under Point I.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in this case was woefully
lacking in proof of the basic elements of bad faith.
The defendant has no quarrel with the application of
the bad faith standard to its defense of cases. However, the defendant believes that in the present case
the court did not adequately consider the evidence
before submitting it to the jury. This was not merely
a question of negligence which offers an expansive
field of consideration by the jury. It was rather an
inquiry as to whether certain narrowly defined elements of bad faith were present. It has been pointed
out clearly by the many courts facing this problem
that bad faith is composed of a fraudulent intent
or dishonesty. In order to have a prima facie case
of bad faith there must be substantial evidence that
such intent was present. The jmy should not be
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allowed to speculate as to the insurer's intent merely
upon evidence that an offer was made and rejected.
However, in the present case the jury was allowed
to speculate upon such evidence, notwithstanding
a complete lack of evidence that the insurer had exhibited any of the objective elements of bad faith
set out in the Brown case as being essential to a
finding of bad faith. An examination of the cases
in 40 A.L.R. (2d) 168 where bad faith has been
found will disclose that there was objective proof
of the insurer's dishonesty, not merely proof that
an offer was made which, when viewed retrospectively, would have been accepted. The plaintiff may
have shown a prima facie case of mistake, but has
failed to establish any evidence going beyond that
point to an establishment of fraudulent or dishonest
intent. In light of this clear lack of evidence and
defendant's absolute defense based on Ammerman's
acquiescence in the conduct of the defense, defendant respectfully petitions the Court to reverse the
judgment of the lower court and fnter judgment
that as a matter of law plaintiffs failed to establish
a prima facie case of bad faith.
In the event the Court does not grant the above
relief, the defendant submits that a new trial is
necessary in order to cure the prejudicial errors
committed by the trial court in allowing the plain49
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tiff Soliz to prosecute this action without any rights
against the defendant and in allowing in as evidence confidential communications between defendant and its counsel.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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